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ADDRESSING IMPERFECTIONS IN THE TAX
SYSTEM: PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE
REFORM?
Leandra Lederman* and Stephen W. Mazza**
PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX
SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH - AND CHEAT EVERYBODY
ELSE. By David Cay Johnston. New York: Penguin Group Inc. 2003.
Pp. iii, 338. $25.95.
I. INTRODUCTION
Books about tax administration tend to fall into one of two broad
categories: those that paint the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") as
an agency peopled by corrupt, out-of-control bureaucrats who take
pleasure in seeing innocent taxpayers suffer,' and those that tell
readers how to structure their affairs to minimize the risk of incurring
an IRS employee's wrath during a tax audit.2 Perfectly Legal, the full
* Visiting William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University School of Law
- Bloomington and Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. A.B. 1987,
Bryn Mawr College; J.D. 1990, New York University; LL.M. (Taxation) 1993, New York
University. - Ed. The authors would like to thank Ajay Mehrotra for helpful comments on
a prior draft of this Review; Craig Lerner for helpful discussions; Brian Glazer for research
assistance; and the Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington and the University of
Kansas School of Law for financial support.
** Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. B.S. 1989, Samford
University; J.D. 1992, University of Alabama; LL.M. (Taxation) 1993, New York University.
-Ed.
1. See, e.g., SHELLEY L. DAVIS, UNBRIDLED POWER: INSIDE THE SECRET CULTURE OF
THE IRS (1997) (describing the author's experiences as an IRS historian and the charges of
ethical and legal violations on the part of IRS employees that she made during her tenure);
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO DESTROY 14 (1999)
(describing the IRS as an agency with "unchecked power" and having a "culture of isolation
that protects against interference and oversight"); RICHARD YANCEY, CONFESSIONS OF A
TAX COLLECTOR: ONE MAN'S TOUR OF DUTY INSIDE THE IRS (2004) (recounting the
author's experiences as an IRS collection agent and the misconduct and abuse allegedly
carried out by fellow IRS employees). But cf. DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE,
THE GREAT AMERICAN TAX DODGE: HOW SPIRALING FRAUD AND AVOIDANCE ARE
KILLING FAIRNESS, DESTROYING THE INCOME TAX, AND COSTING YOU (2000) (discussing
the rise in tax evasion and Congress's role in limiting IRS enforcement of the tax laws).
2. See, e.g., AMIR D. ACZEL, HOW TO BEAT THE I.R.S. AT ITS OWN GAME (2d ed.
1995); FREDERICK W. DAILY, STAND UP TO THE IRS (6th ed. 2001); ARNOLD S.
GOLDSTEIN, HOW TO SETTLE WITH THE IRS ... FOR PENNIES ON THE DOLLAR (2d ed.
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title of which communicates David Cay Johnston's intent to focus on
the tax system, does neither of those things. Instead, it is a book much
like The Great American Tax Dodge,3 which explained the marly
varieties of tax fraud; the difficulties the IRS faces in pursuing high-
income individuals; the influence the affluent have on lawmaking; and
Congress's success in tying the hands of the IRS.
In its strongest chapters, Perfectly Legal examines the inner
workings of the IRS and describes the agency in a very different
way from that represented in the popular press. While other authors
may decry the threat of overzealous IRS agents, Johnston laments
the inability of IRS employees to pursue known acts of noncompliance
because of resource limitations and political pressures. While
other authors may complain about the complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code, leaving readers with the impression that the IRS
is responsible for its enactment, Johnston lays blame for this
complexity squarely where it belongs - with Congress and executive
branch policymakers.4
Johnston's coverage of tax issues as an investigative reporter for
the New York Times won him a Pulitzer Prize in 2001. Although many
of Johnston's articles focus on complex issues of tax policy and
administration - such as the restructuring of the IRS or efforts to
repeal the estate tax - he, unlike most other journalists who attempt
to tackle tax issues in the general press, is able to explain these
difficult concepts in a thorough and engaging manner. Johnston's
expos6s, particularly those relating to the growth of the tax shelter
industry in recent years, illustrate his formidable investigatory skills.
While IRS officials may not be willing to admit as much, his articles
apparently have brought to light a number of tax dodges that, if not
for his reports, might still be hidden from government regulators.'
As its prologue suggests, Perfectly Legal draws in part on stories
Johnston published in the New York Times.6 The prologue explains
1997); MARTIN S. KAPLAN, WHAT THE IRS DOESN'T WANT YOU TO KNOW: A CPA
REVEALS THE TRICKS OF THE TRADE (9th ed. 2004). Even this category of books sometimes
cannot help but take aim at the IRS. See KAPLAN, supra, at 6 (describing the "long,
powerful, and often ruthless and arbitrary arm of the IRS").
3. BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 1. Unlike The Great American Tax Dodge, Perfectly
Legal does not focus only on tax issues. See infra text accompanying notes 6-7.
4. For a similar approach, see BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 1.
5. See David Cay Johnston, U.S. Accuses 2 Audit Firms of Assisting Tax Violations, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2002, at C1 (reporting that the IRS learned of tax shelters marketed by
accounting firm KPMG from an article in the New York Times).
6. For example, as discussed below, Johnston recounts in Perfectly Legal the situation of
David and Margaret Klaassen, a couple surprised to be hit by the alternative minimum tax.
See infra text accompanying notes 36-41. Portions of Johnston's discussion of the Klaassens
originally appeared in the New York Times. See David Cay Johnston, Funny, They Don't
Look Like Fat Cats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, § 3, at 1.
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that Johnston's initial goal in covering taxes was "to launch a running
investigation" of the tax system (p. 1). Many of the chapters of
Perfectly Legal do not discuss tax issues, however. Instead, they
criticize such things as an increase in income inequality over the past
thirty or so years and a tendency Johnston finds on the part of large
corporations to prioritize compensating their key executives while
disregarding the needs of the rank-and-file workers. Johnston claims
that, because "there is no free lunch," the super rich "leave part of
their bill on your table" (p. 11). According to Johnston, politicians and
their campaign contributors are behind this trend, though the
connection is not always made explicit.7 The tax system is but one
piece of the dark picture Johnston's completed puzzle depicts.
The chapters that do focus on taxation discuss issues that range
from the specific and technical to larger issues of IRS enforcement.
The theme that implicitly ties together Johnston's complaints about
growing income inequality, the priorities of large corporations,
decreasing progressivity in the federal tax system, and Congress's
"handcuff[ing of] the tax police" (p. 150) is that low-income and
middle-income individuals are fighting just to survive, while the well-
to-do are doing better and better. In fact, much of Perfectly Legal is
comprised of narratives about particular individuals, some of whom
appear to represent, for Johnston, an entire class of people, such as the
working poor, the middle class, or "the political donor class."
Given the broad range of topics that Perfectly Legal covers, it is
unfortunate that it is not divided into parts. Some chapters are clearly
connected to chapters they precede or follow while others essentially
stand alone. As the next Part of this Review suggests, the first half of
Perfectly Legal is particularly disjointed; it addresses a variety of
seemingly unconnected issues, ranging from demographic trends to
public disclosure of executive compensation to specific tax loopholes.
Following that description of the book in Part II, Part III of this
7. The tax theme expressed in the prologue, which reappears periodically in the rest 
of
the book, is that "our tax system now levies the poor, the middle class and even the 
upper
middle class to subsidize the rich .... P. 2. When comparing relative tax burdens,
Johnston's focus, though generally not explicit, is the percentage of their income particular
classes of individuals pay in taxes, not the absolute amount of taxes they pay. Thus, 
one of
his principal claims is that lower-income individuals are taxed at a higher rate than higher-
income individuals - in other words, that the combined federal income tax/social security
system, in practice, is regressive:
[W]hen all federal taxes are considered - from those on gasoline and beer to Social Security
taxes as well as income and estate taxes - the [richest] 1 percent's share drops to about a
fourth of the total tax bill.... If you tally up the economic benefits of the top 1 percent that
do not show up in income statistics.. . then the richest 1 percent are taxed more lightly than
the middle class. The same data show that the poor are taxed almost as heavily as the rich
are - and even more heavily than the super rich.
May 2005]
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Review provides further critique and Part IV suggests a line of inquiry
for future analysis of tax administration.
II. THE BOOK'S STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS
Perfectly Legal begins by introducing Jonathan Blattmachr, an
attorney who specializes in finding loopholes that enable the wealthyto save taxes. The purpose the story serves in the book can be
summarized in a statement Johnston attributes to Blattmachr: "TheU.S. tax code is the most political law in the world" (p. 9). ChapterOne also serves as an introduction to some of the topics discussed inlater chapters, such as a number of tax compliance issues, including
marketed tax shelters, corporate inversions, and difficulties indetecting certain types of tax evasion, as well as IRS reform resultingfrom Senate Finance Committee hearings in 1997 and 1998 (pp. 11-14). It also introduces Johnston's underlying theme that wealth
concentration in the United States is partly due to a tax system that
taxes the "super rich" more lightly than others (p. 11).Johnston connects that claim with the notion that the super rich
can hire attorneys like Mr. Blattmachr to develop strategies under
which money can change hands "without showing up in the official
statistics on wealth and income" (p. 11). Not only that, but super-richindividuals have more opportunities to evade taxes because theygenerally are not wage earners and receive less income subject toinformation reporting; "their friends in Congress have slashed budgetsfor inspecting the tax returns of the rich and super rich"; and, if they
own businesses, they can live subsidized lifestyles by charging some oftheir expenses to their businesses (p. 13). Johnston argues, "[s]ince atleast 1983 it has been the explicit, but unstated, policy in Washington
to let the richest Americans pay a smaller portion of their incomes intaxes and to defer more of their taxes ... while collecting more in
taxes from those in the middle class" (p. 18).
After the first chapter, Johnston turns to a discussion ofdemographic trends, focusing primarily on changes in the U.S.
economy in the last thirty to thirty-five years. His principal point isthat, once earnings are adjusted for inflation, the salaries of mostAmericans have remained relatively flat while "the incomes of those
at the very top soared" (p. 29), resulting in increased incomeinequality.8 Johnston also discusses a trend over the same thirty or soyears towards lower top income tax brackets and increasedgovernment reliance on Social Security revenue, which, because of its
8. In his discussion of an increase in average house size, Johnston points out that thehome mortgage interest deduction provides a bigger subsidy for higher-income individuals
and those who buy bigger houses. Pp. 21-22.
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wage-base cap and lack of zero bracket, disproportionately burdens
low-income individuals (p. 41).
Johnston connects growing income inequality with increased
compensation for managers of large corporations. This created a
demand for corporate tax shelters to keep profits high, "which helped
shift the overall tax burden off capital and onto labor" (p. 41).
Johnston blames Congress and other "lawmakers" for funneling
benefits to "Corporate America" by allowing the demise of personal
liability for the acts of other partners in a firm,9 facilitating the "spread
of 401(k) plans,"1 and "attacking" the IRS.1
Johnston also includes a chapter on executive compensation,
where he begins a discussion of stock compensation with a story about
Robert Goizueta (pp. 45-47), Coca-Cola's one-time CEO. Here,
Johnston's focus is on compensation arrangements that allow a small
group of high-level executives to defer reporting a large portion of
their compensation until future years (p. 47). According to Johnston,
these "secret" arrangements are significant because they contribute to
the "economic pain felt by millions of workers whose compensation
was squeezed so that the top executives could take a larger share of
the [corporation's] compensation budget" (p. 47). Johnston also
argues that because a company cannot deduct deferred compensation,
9. P. 42. Johnston does not mention what law he is referring to when he states that
"lawmakers encouraged these corporate [accounting] scandals [such as those involving
Enron and Global Crossing] by ending a single legal principle - the policy that each partner
in an accounting or law firm was liable for the acts of every other partner." Id. It is unclear
whether this reference to lawmakers refers to members of Congress or state legislators. See
id. Earlier in the same paragraph, Johnston refers to "lawmakers - often passing bills they
had not read (some of which came to the floor of the House or the Senate without a single
public hearing)," and the prior paragraph discusses the U.S. Congress. Id. Later in the book,
Johnston refers to the limited liability partnership ("LLP") as the "structure [that] destroys
the self-policing mechanism that helps to keep legal and accounting firms from using their
enormous power to the detriment of others" because the LLP eliminates personal liability
for the acts of other partners. Pp. 258-59. Johnston points out that the Texas legislature
passed the first limited liability partnership law. P. 259; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The New
Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 325, 328 (1997). Johnston also states
that it was the IRS that ruled in 1988 that a professional firm could be organized as a LLP.
P. 259. The IRS did rule in 1988 that a Wyoming limited liability company could be taxed as
a partnership, see Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, but that ruling does not address LLPs or
professional firms. In 1992, the IRS issued a letter ruling upholding partnership taxation for
a Texas LLP. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-016 (Apr. 16, 1992).
10. P. 42. Johnston also criticizes a "federal law that requires companies to put too little
money away in pension plans for younger workers." Id. Here, as elsewhere, Johnston does
not state which law he is referencing. It appears from an article he published in 1995, David
Cay Johnston, The Fading Pension, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1995, at Dl, that he may be referring
to changes enacted in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See Pub. L. No.
103-465, § 761, 108 Stat. 4809, 5024-34 (1994).
11. Pp. 42-43. Here, Johnston is referring to the highly publicized 1997 and 1998
Congressional hearings on IRS reform. See infra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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it raises the company's tax bill and is, therefore, "very expensive for
shareholders, rank-and-file workers, and taxpayers" (p. 48).
The theme of corporate excess and its tax cost continues with a
chapter focusing on the valuation of company-provided personal air
travel. Johnston points out that the valuation rules often have made itless expensive for an executive to fly on a company-owned plane andpay the associated income taxes than to fly on a commercial airliner in
coach class (p. 62). In addition, the income tax cost to the executivehas often been substantially less than even the direct cost to the
company for use of the plane (p. 62). Johnston describes such
executive "perks" as an example of a stealth tax cut for the wealthy
and powerful, and another way in which corporations and the tax code
can, in effect, subsidize executives' personal lifestyles. 2
After his indictment of big business, Johnston addresses a variety
of specific tax issues. First, he discusses congressional efforts to repeal
the estate tax. Johnston makes a convincing case that no family farms
actually have been lost to the estate tax - the false premise that is the
primary argument among politicians in favor of repeal - and thatinstead the beneficiaries of repeal (and the force behind the push for
elimination of the tax) are wealthy individuals (pp. 71-79). In this
context, he points out the power of rhetoric and slogans: "The termdeath tax is a superb example of marketing triumphing over reasoneddebate."'3 He also points out that "repeal of the estate tax means
a heavier reliance on taxes paid during life such as income
taxes" (p. 85).
Johnston accuses politicians who voted for estate tax repeal of not
only seeking to shift more of the tax burden onto wage-based income,but also of attempting to dramatically soften the burden on the
wealthiest Americans by including provisions in the 2000 taxlegislation - repeal of the gift tax combined with an unlimited basis
step-up for assets transferred at death - that would have allowedindividuals to transfer wealth from one generation to another while
avoiding taxable gain (p. 86). This loophole was closed beforeCongress passed the final bill but, according to Johnston, such efforts
"illustrate the drive by the political donor class to free itself from the
burden of taxes" (pp. 90-91).
12. Pp. 67-70. Johnston points out that the company can deduct the cost of the use of the
airplane. Pp. 62, 67. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, signed by the President onOctober 22, 2004, includes a provision that limits an employer's tax deduction for an
executive's personal use of a company aircraft to the amount included in the executive'sincome as compensation. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §
907(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1654-55.
13. P. 81. Professor Lee Fennell points out that the broad unpopularity of the estate taxis puzzling given that only a tiny fraction of estates actually are subject to it, and,presumably, the revenue it collects forestalls increases in other taxes. See Lee Anne Fennell,
Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REv. 567, 593-94 (2003).
1428 [Vol. 103:1423
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Next, Johnston discusses the alternative minimum tax ("AMT"), a
separate set of rules in the tax code originally designed to ensure that
wealthy taxpayers paid some minimum annual tax regardless of their
deductions and credits. Johnston focuses on how the AMT operates
nearly invisibly under current law to reduce the value of the "Bush tax
cuts" for many taxpayers, mostly middle-income (pp. 94-95). Johnston
seems to object to the opacity of the AMT, which he calls the "stealth
tax" (pp. 92, 95), its impending effect on the middle class (pp. 104,
111), its effect on those with large families (p. 105), and what he calls
"another levy"' 4 on taxpayers.
Following the discussion of the AMT, Johnston focuses on the flip
side of deferral, namely, payment in advance, in a chapter entitled
"How Social Security Taxes Subsidize the Rich." He points out that, in
recent years, workers have paid more in Social Security taxes than was
paid out in benefits in those years, which, in effect, amounts to an
advance payment of tax (pp. 118, 122-23). The extra funds "were used
to pay the ordinary bills of the government, making up for the taxes
that were no longer being paid by the rich because of the 1981 income
tax cuts" (p. 123). Another "raid" on Social Security funds occurred in
2001, when Congress passed a series of tax cuts, the benefits of which
flowed largely to upper-income taxpayers (pp. 126-27). Johnston
explains that Social Security is an income redistribution program. He
argues that the very poor receive benefits larger than their
contributions and the "rich get nearly a free ride" because of the wage
cap on contributions. Returning to one of his themes, Johnston states,
"[i]t is the middle class and the upper middle class who pay the price
for this inequity" (p. 125).
Chapter Nine is the first in a series of chapters that discuss the
workings of the IRS. It focuses on audits of low-income taxpayers who
claim the earned income credit ("EIC"), a refundable tax credit that
can reduce or eliminate tax liability for the eligible working poor.
Johnston points out that, "[i]n 1999, for the first time, the poor were
more likely than the rich to have their returns audited" (p. 132). This
is a difficult issue. The EIC requirements are complex and EIC claims
do have a high error rate,15 but there is little tax money at stake in
an audit of a low-income individual.16 Johnston recommends that
Congress simplify the EIC and adopt a uniform definition of "child"
14. P. 95. Johnston's analysis of the AMT is critiqued below. See infra notes 36-41 and
accompanying text.
15. P. 138; see also Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not 
Fit
All, 51 U. KAN. L. REv. 1145, 1146 (2003) ("Of the estimated $31.3 billion in EITC claims
made by taxpayers filing in 1999, approximately $8.5 to $9.9 billion should not have been
paid.").
16. For example, Professor Book notes that the maximum EIC for a taxpayer 
with two
qualifying children in 2002 was $4,140. Book, supra note 15, at 1194.
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for federal income tax purposes. 7 He claims that simplifying the EIC
could reduce the amount of refund anticipation loans and check-
cashing fees the working poor pay to private businesses to accelerate
their EIC payments (pp. 141-44).
In the second half of the book, Johnston turns his attention moredirectly to issues of tax enforcement and the workings of the IRS,
offering explanations for what he believes to be the Agency's failed
enforcement practices and policies. Johnston attributes the IRS'sfailed enforcement practices primarily to structural changes brought
about by IRS reform legislation enacted in 1998, which he
characterizes as a "boon for tax cheats of all kinds" (p. 150). He
recounts the circumstances surrounding the Senate FinanceCommittee hearings leading up to the 1998 legislation, at whichtaxpayers and some of the IRS's own employees testified to unlawful
treatment by the Agency. Johnston points out that most of this
testimony was later discredited (pp. 146, 155-56) and that the IRS
could not adequately respond to its accusers because, by law, it mustkeep taxpayer information confidential (p. 148). Nevertheless, thehearings had their intended effect and Congress enacted widespread
changes to the tax enforcement and collection process that, according
to Johnston, "handcuffed the tax police" (p. 150).
One change that Johnston holds in particular disdain, and that hebelieves created the greatest hindrance to the IRS's ability to enforce
the tax laws effectively, was the enactment of the "ten deadly sins" -
a list of infractions by IRS employees for which the default sanction istermination of employment (p. 150). The threat of discharge,
according to IRS personnel interviewed by Johnston, led front-lin&
IRS employees to close audits quickly and to take a reluctant stance
against well-connected, but noncompliant, taxpayers. This fear of
reprisal, Johnston asserts, led to the documented decline in liens,levies, and seizures that followed IRS reform."8
In Chapter Eleven, Johnston discusses another important
structural change brought about by the 1998 legislation 
- a
17. Pp. 140, 144. There has been a movement for such a change for a while. Forexample, the National Taxpayer Advocate included such a proposal in her 2001 report toCongress. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 76, 80 (2001), athttp://www.irs.gov/pub/lrs-utl/2001-tas.pdf Recently enacted legislation includes such achange. See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 201, 205, 118
Stat. 1166, 1169, 1176.
18. Pp. 151-52. Others have stated this as well. See, e.g., BARLETr & STEELE, supra note1, at 131; Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the PartialParadigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 107(2004); Amy Hamilton, Ten Deadly Sins: Effective Tool or Invitation to EmployeeHarassment?, 85 TAX NOTES 1360 (1999); Ann Murphy & David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins:A Law With Unintended Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 871 (2002); Lee A. Sheppard, TheSixth Deadly Sin, 92 TAX NOTES 1018 (2001).
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congressionally mandated reorganization of the IRS's organizational
structure. The primary architect of the reorganization plan, and the
IRS Commissioner who oversaw the plan's initial implementation, was
Charles Rossotti. Johnston criticizes Rossotti's efforts in bringing
cultural change to the IRS as being too heavily focused on so-called
"customer" service at the expense of enforcement (p. 163). Johnston
attributes much of the dramatic, across-the-board decline in audit
rates during Rossotti's tenure (pp. 164-66) to decisions by Rossotti and
IRS officials to direct enforcement resources toward low-income
taxpayers, whose returns tend to be easier to audit but yield lower
collections, rather than higher-income and business taxpayers, whose
returns tend to be more complicated but more likely to generate
higher tax collections. 19
In a series of chapters criticizing the IRS's enforcement activities,
Johnston offers examples of the IRS's inaction in the face of known
acts of noncompliance. He recounts the tale of Jerry Curnutt, an
IRS expert responsible for identifying erroneous partnership tax
returns. After discovering entries on returns that might indicate
fraudulent activity, Curnutt proposed a low-cost solution that,
according to Johnston, would have generated millions of dollars in
taxes due. Curnutt's proposal apparently drew little interest from his
supervisors, which Johnston attributes to several factors, including
political influence from wealthy campaign contributors (p. 172), lack
of IRS funding (p. 182), and general mismanagement of the Agency
(pp. 180-83).
Johnston also exposes the use of tax-exempt insurance companies
to shelter hundreds of millions in investment profits from U.S. taxes
(pp. 186-93) and identifies, by name, individuals who have invested in
schemes designed to zero-out their tax liability, as well as others who
simply have refused to file income tax returns (pp. 194-96, 201-02). In
the face of these revelations, Johnston reports, the IRS showed a
reluctance to, and in some cases seemingly refused to, pursue these
individuals. According to Johnston, such noncompliance is a "rip in
the social fabric that holds the nation together" (p. 203) and continues
to grow because of IRS inaction.
As noted above,20 Johnston often is at his best when discussing
complex tax transactions. Chapter Sixteen, which analyzes the
background, tax implications, and policy debate surrounding the cross-
border dividend-stripping transaction at issue in the Compaq case,
21
19. Pp. 166-67. Later in the book, Johnston praises Rossotti for recognizing the negative
effect his policies had on overall levels of tax compliance. P. 293.
20. See supra text accompanying note 5.
21. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778 (5th
Cir. 2001).
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illustrates Johnston's gift for taking an otherwise dry topic andinfusing it with interest and importance.22 Johnston's discussion of
efforts by U.S. businesses to reincorporate in tax haven countries in
order to reduce their corporate tax liability is equally engaging. He
entertainingly recounts the political debate surrounding the efforts byStanley Works's management to convince shareholders to approve a
reincorporation plan (pp. 237-50). Not part of the debate, Johnstonpoints out, was the huge tax-free profits Stanley's high-level
management would have realized had the reincorporation plan
passed (p. 247).
While Johnston is highly critical of the IRS throughout the secondhalf of the book, 23 he makes it clear that its failure cannot be
attributed solely to the Agency's bureaucracy and inefficiency. He
returns to the notion of an influential "political donor class," that,
according to Johnston, not only influences the development of taxpolicy, but also affects the Agency's enforcement practices.24 AlthoughJohnston offers little direct evidence to support his belief,
characterizing these themes as mere conspiracy theory would do adisservice to Johnston's skills as an investigative reporter. Facts
uncovered by Johnston strongly suggest that IRS supervisors refused
to support the conclusions of IRS agents who were auditing big oil
companies like Unocal and Chevron, thereby raising seriousquestions about the IRS's priorities relating to enforcing the law and
collecting revenue. 5
Of course, the "political donor class" must necessarily draw itsinfluence from politicians, so members of Congress, both Republican
22. Pp. 220-27. Foreign tax credit manipulation of the type at issue in Compaq
represents one of the few instances Johnston reports in which Congress acted to shut down,
at least partially, a tax shelter-type transaction. See I.R.C. § 901(k) (imposing a holdingperiod requirement for purposes of crediting foreign taxes associated with foreign-sourcedividends). More recently, Congress passed a host of provisions designed to further curtailthe use of abusive tax-avoidance transactions, including expanded tax shelter disclosure
requirements and increased penalties applicable to tax shelter promoters. American JobsCreation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 815(a), 818(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1581, 1584.
23. Throughout Perfectly Legal, Johnston describes the IRS as an agency subject topolitical manipulation and an unworthy adversary of those in the legal and accounting
community. Johnston's stories in this regard appear not to be intended to generate sympathyfor the IRS, but rather to stand as a strong critique of an IRS management unwilling to
confront political pressure and of a Congress that intentionally underfunds the Agency.
24. P. 216 (reporting that twenty percent of IRS managers routinely observed
preferential treatment given to taxpayers with "political clout").
25. Pp. 252-53. Similar accusations arose in 2004 relating to the IRS's audit of Micrel,Inc. See Warren Rojas, Agent Says IRS Used Disclosure, Circular Referrals to Block Audit,104 TAX NOTES 687 (2004) (IRS agent accused of wrongdoing after making public
allegations of collusion between corporation under examination and senior IRS executives).
1432
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and Democrat, do not fare well in Johnston's book.26 Johnston accuses
politicians not only of creating a hostile atmosphere toward tax
enforcement, but also of underfunding the IRS in an effort to tie its
hands (p. 295). He also attributes blame for the current state of tax
enforcement to judges who ignore financial reality in favor of
textualist constructions (pp. 224-26), lawyers who facilitate tax dodges
by providing a sense of legitimacy to otherwise questionable
transactions (p. 273), and accountants and advisors who market tax-
saving schemes (pp. 269-70).
The prospects for improvement, in Johnston's mind, are dim. In
the chapter entitled "Is Reform Possible?" Johnston relates efforts by
politicians to block then-departing Commissioner Rossotti from
issuing before Congress a stinging criticism of the IRS's enforcement
activities and a call for increased Agency resources (pp. 292-96). As
Johnston sees it, the spread of tax cheating is a predictable outcome of
the government's failure to direct audit resources towards business
owners and investors who have the greatest opportunity to cheat.
Addressing some of the compliance problems through substantive
reform of the income tax also presents serious challenges, according to
Johnston, because of the capacity of lawyers and accountants to help
clients manipulate the system and the recent penchant of Congress to
make the tax code more complex.27 Johnston raises the possibility of a
switch from an income tax to a consumption tax, but seems to reject
the idea, criticizing consumption taxes as regressive and skewed in
favor of the rich, and a transition to such a tax as potentially
economically disruptive (pp. 300-04). Fundamental reform, according
to Johnston, "will remain elusive so long as Congress avoids the
serious, and mundane, issues of how tax administration works, puts []
willfully uninformed [Congressmen] in charge of IRS oversight and
shrivels the budget for tax law enforcement while handcuffing the tax
police" (p. 304).
III. DOES PERFECTLY LEGAL LIVE UP TO ITS SUBTITLE?
Perfectly Legal is a smooth and engaging read. Johnston is an
excellent storyteller; he makes ordinary people and technical issues
seem to come alive on the page. The stories work well as newspaper
columns, where a single issue can be the focus. Unfortunately, the
compilation of stories does not work as well as a book. Johnston
26. Johnston does attempt to present a balanced picture, noting instances in which
Congress acted to curtail tax schemes. See p. 227.
27. P. 298 ("Any real reform of our tax system must address the virtually unlimited
capacity of financial engineers to fabricate profits and losses, to hide them in layers of
complex transactions and to withhold documents that would enable auditors to understand
these transactions.").
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simply does not explain how the various topics fit together, nor does
he make links between them.28 If the book were divided into parts,
each focused on a different aspect of Johnston's concern about the
suffering of the "little guy" at the hands of politicians and their
donors, it would be a better book. To do that, though, Johnston would
have to give up the premise that the book is a comprehensive report
on the tax system and admit that, in his view, the tax system is just one
component of the problem.
Even then, the book would need more work to make its case that
politicians and their donors are rigging the "system" (however
defined) to harm the little guy. Certain chapters show quite
persuasively that the effect of Congress's actions has been to cut taxes
on the rich (notably, the estate tax repeal) or hamper tax collection(IRS reform). The facts reported in these chapters make a good case
that these actions were no accident. In other chapters, however, the
connection between political action and a burden on the poor or a tax
break for the rich is left unstated. Is Johnston implying that such a
connection exists?
There is a similar issue with respect to the corporate greed that
Johnston laments. Johnston seems to ignore market forces, acting as if
employees whose compensation or benefits are cut have no
opportunity to seek jobs elsewhere, likely exaggerating the effects of
the phenomena he discusses. But, assuming that he is correct, to what
extent does Johnston blame politicians? The links Johnston makes
between corporate activity and acts of Congress seem tenuous at best
- Johnston does not explain the connection between them.
In addition, Johnston's economic analysis, though clearly not
intended to be overly technical, is inconsistent at times. One of
Johnston's themes is that there is "no free lunch, '29 so that when one
group lowers its taxes, another group has to bear the cost of that
forgone revenue. 3' The basic principle that Johnston is expressing is as
true of corporate taxpayers as it is of individual taxpayers (p. 12).
28. By contrast, The Great American Tax Dodge, which is similar in many ways to
Perfectly Legal, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, expresses a clear theme to which
each of its chapters relate. This makes The Great American Tax Dodge clearer and more
convincing.
29. Johnston uses this phrase both to refer to taxes that are not paid by the rich, p. 11,
and in the context of the cost of "the true price of deferral," p. 52.
30. Johnston also does not mention that some economists believe that lower taxes may
spur growth in the economy, leading to the same amount of tax collections in the aggregate,
while lowering the burden imposed on each taxpayer. See, e.g., JOHN 0. Fox, IF AMERICANS
REALLY UNDERSTOOD THE INCOME TAX: UNCOVERING OUR MOST EXPENSIVE
IGNORANCE 165-66 (2001).
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Thus, if a corporate taxpayer lowers its tax bill, the rest of us will have
to pay more.31
What about when a corporate taxpayer pays a larger tax bill?
When discussing executive compensation, Johnston complains that
when a company does not get a tax deduction for compensation paid,
"shareholders had to pay an extra 35 cents [per nondeductible dollar
of salary] to cover additional corporate income taxes" (p. 56).
Assuming that a corporation is actually paying taxes at a thirty-five
percent rate - an assumption that contradicts the statistics Johnston
cites elsewhere32 - then, all other things being equal, a forgone
deduction costs a corporation thirty-five cents on the dollar. Johnston
points out that either the shareholders may bear that cost (pp. 48, 56)
or the cost may be passed along, such as through elimination of jobs or
reduction of employee benefits (pp. 51-53).
Thus, Johnston finds possible burdens on people such as "rank and
file workers" from both tax increases and tax cuts. The problem is that
Johnston is looking only at one side of each equation. In the context of
a tax cut for large corporations, Johnston's main point is that, if one
group pays less in tax, others must pay more, in order for tax revenue
to stay the same (assuming no growth in the economy - an issue
Johnston does not address).33 In the context of higher taxes for large
corporations, the crux of Johnston's argument seems to be that if a
company spends more on taxes, it must spend less elsewhere, such as
on the compensation of rank-and-file employees, in order for after-tax
profits to stay the same 34 (assuming market prices have not changed).
What Johnston does not mention are corollaries to each of his
arguments: Under Johnston's analysis, (1) if a corporation pays less in
taxes and were to keep after-tax profits the same,35 it would
accordingly spend more elsewhere, such as on its employees, and (2) if
large corporations pay more in taxes and tax revenues stay the same,
then others should experience a tax cut.
31. For example, in Chapter Five, Johnston states, "Someone must bear the real costs of
the use of company jets. They are borne by the shareholders, who may in turn deduct them
on the corporate income tax return, forcing all taxpayers to pick up 35 percent of the true
costs." P. 62.
32. Johnston notes that "[c]orporations... lowered the portion of their profits that go to
federal income taxes from 26 cents of each dollar in 1993 to 22 cents in 1998, even though
the official corporate income tax rate remained unchanged at 35 percent." P. 12. He also
laments the rise of corporate tax shelters. See p. 41.
33. See supra note 30.
34. Johnston does not say this explicitly but it seems implicit in his statement that "[t]he
true price of deferral may be hidden, but it still must be paid somehow and by someone,"
p. 52, and in other statements about the costs of deferral, including shrinking payrolls. See
pp. 48, 51-53.
35. Of course, a corporation facing reduced tax liability may simply enjoy an increase in
after-tax profits.
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Johnston's discussion of the AMT similarly presents only part of
the picture. As indicated above, an important focus of Johnston's
discussion is how the AMT reduces the value of the "Bush tax cuts"
for many taxpayers (pp. 94-95). For example, he states, "[b]etween
2003 and 2012 the Bush tax cuts will force an increase of $560 billion
in taxes to be paid under the alternative minimum tax" (p. 95). It is
probably the case that the loss of much-touted tax cuts was a surprise
for many taxpayers. And it is certainly true that nonobvious and
complex provisions impose costs on taxpayers. Johnston's discussion
could imply that a tax cut actually increased federal income tax
liability for some taxpayers, however.
As Johnston points out, the taxpayer pays the higher of the
amount computed under the regular income tax or the AMT (p. 95).
Thus, a taxpayer paying AMT is, by definition, paying more in taxes
than he would if the AMT did not apply. And a taxpayer-favorable
change under the regular tax without a corresponding change in the
AMT will make more people liable for AMT, all other things being
equal. But those two points combined do not add up to increased
overall federal income tax liability resulting from the availability of a
benefit under the regular tax.
For example, Johnston discusses the Klaassens, a family with ten
children in 1994 who owed $1,085 more in tax than they had paid
because they had not realized the AMT applied and had calculated
their tax liability applying only the regular income tax (p. 105).
According to Johnston, the calculations of Mr. Klaassen, a lawyer,
revealed that "the [Klaassens'] eighth child set off the alternative tax
at a cost of $223. A ninth child raised the bill to $717. And ten
children, the number the Klaassens had in 1994, increased the tax bill
by $1,085, the exact amount the IRS said was due in extra taxes for
1994" (p. 105).
Johnston does not report the amount of the Klaassens' income or
deductions, but the Tax Court opinion in Klaassen v. Commissioner
does, 36 so it is possible to calculate their regular tax liability and AMT
under the scenarios Johnston raises. Although it is true that the
Klaassens' eighth child caused the AMT to apply to them in 1994 in
36. Klaassen v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 20 (1998), affd, 182 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1999)(unpublished op.). According to the Tax Court opinion, for 1994, the Klaassens reported
adjusted gross income ("AGI") of $83,056.42, itemized deductions of $19,563.95, which
included $4,767.13 of medical and dental expenses and $3,263.56 of state and local taxes;
exemptions of $29,400 (two personal exemptions and ten dependency exemptions, at $2,450
each); taxable income of $34,092.47; and regular tax of $5,111. Id. In 1994, married taxpayers
were taxed at a rate of fifteen percent on taxable income up to $38,000 and at a twenty-eight
percent rate after that. See Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 581, 582, § 3.01 tbl.1. Fifteen
percent of $34,092.47 is $5,113. The 1994 tax table, however, provides $5,111 as the tax on$34,050 to $34,100. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 45 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/ilO4O.pdf.
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the amount of $223,11 that does not mean the Klaassens would have
paid less in federal income tax if they had had seven children instead
of eight or more.
According to the IRS's computations, which the Klaassens did not
dispute, the Klaassens' tentative minimum tax for 1994 was $6,196,
giving rise to AMT of $1,085.38 If the Klaassens had had only seven
children in 1994, their tentative minimum tax would have remained
the same, $6,196, because dependency exemptions are disallowed
under the AMT.3 9 With seven children, however, the Klaassens would
have had a regular tax liability of $6,65940 - an amount that would
have exceeded their tentative minimum tax.41 Thus, if the Klaassens
had had seven children in 1994, they would have owed no AMT but
would have owed $463 more in federal income tax for 1994 than their
actual liability of $6,196. Therefore, it is not the case that the
Klaassen's eighth child increased their federal income tax liability. In
fact, the opposite is true. Their eighth child reduced their tax liability
by $463, and their federal income tax liability remained flat with their
ninth and tenth children.
Of course there are problems with the AMT. Among other issues,
if the AMT continues on its current trajectory, it will become a mass
tax, which was not intended when it was enacted.4' As Johnston points
37. If the Klaassens had had eight children in 1994, their tentative minimum tax would
have remained at $6,196, while their regular tax liability would have been $5,973 according
to the tax tables. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 1040, at 45 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf. It would have been
$5,977 according to the tax rate charts. The difference between $6,196 and $5,973 is $223, the
amount Johnston refers to as the AMT cost of the Klaassens' eighth child. P. 105. If the
Klaassens had had nine children, their tentative minimum tax for 1994 would once again
have remained at $6,196, while their regular tax liability would have decreased to $5,479
according to the tax tables. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 45 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf. It
would be $5,481 according to the tax rate charts, or fifteen percent of $36,542. See id. Thus,
with nine children, the Klaassens' AMT liability would be $717, just as Johnston reported. P.
105.
38. P. 105. In 1994, the AMT applied a flat exemption of $45,000 but disallowed the
personal and dependency exemptions and the standard deduction. See I.R.C. §§ 55(d),
56(b)(1)(E) (1994); see also Klaassen, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2. The 1994 AMT applied a rate
of twenty-six percent at the Klaassens' income level. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I) (1994); see
also Klaassen, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2.
39. See supra note 38.
40. With only seven children, rather than ten, the Klaassens would have had three fewer
dependency exemptions for purposes of the regular federal income tax, increasing their
taxable income to $41,442 ($34,092 + $2,450 * 3 = $41,442). Using the tax tables would yield
a tax liability of $6,659. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1040, at 46 (1994), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-94/i1040.pdf.
41. Thus, the Klaassens' AMT liability for 1994 would have been zero if they had had
seven children, but that is because their regular tax liability would have been higher than
their tentative minimum tax.
42. As one article comments:
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out, however, that will likely not be the case until approximately 2010(pp. 99-100). By then, if the AMT still exists, the tax law will likely
have changed so that the effect of the AMT on individuals may be
very different than it is now.
Despite these shortcomings in Johnston's discussion of the AMT,
Johnston has provided a service in pointing out how AMT liability can
be a trap for the unwary. Certainly a taxpayer who assumes that
additional children will always lower tax liability is incorrect because
of the AMT. Johnston's voice is a powerful one in promoting change
and his focus on important tax policy issues that can be daunting
in their technicality, such as the AMT and corporate tax shelters,
is commendable.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL REFORM? THE COSTS OF
PROCEDURAL COMPLEXITY
In the final chapter of Perfectly Legal, entitled "Conclusions,"
Johnston sums up his various arguments and makes several proposals.
Initially, he calls for a complete overhaul of the tax system (p. 305),
but he quickly backs away from this large-scale plan in favor of a
series of more modest proposals that, he believes, would reverse the
trend of shifting the tax burden from high-income to middle-income
taxpayers. 3 These proposals include limiting a taxpayer's ability to
defer reporting income to "very limited amounts in retirement savings
plans and pension funds" (p. 313), requiring corporations to calculate
tax liability based on financial accounting concepts (p. 313),
eliminating special tax treatment limited to only certain industries,'
The AMT grew out of a minimum tax that first took effect in 1970, due to legislation enactedin response to public outrage in the wake of testimony by Treasury Secretary Joseph W.Barr (1969) that 155 high-income households had paid no income tax in 1966. Although ithas historically applied to only a very small share of taxpayers, the tax is projected to grow
rapidly over the next decade, transforming it from a class tax to a mass tax.
Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105, 105(2003). In 2001 and again in 2003, Congress increased the exemption amounts under the
AMT, see I.R.C. § 55(d), thereby relieving some taxpayers of AMT liability. The increased
exemption amounts were extended to tax years 2005 and 2006 by the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 103, 118 Stat. 1166, 1168.
43. Pp. 312-17. He also calls for a serious debate over a possible move to a consumption
tax, but it seems clear that he does not favor such a move because it would shift the tax
burden onto labor and away from capital. P. 310. Johnston points out that recent legislative
changes - reducing tax rates on capital gain and dividend income, for instance - have
shifted tax burdens away from capital and onto labor. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 301(a), 302; I.R.C. § 1(h)(1), (11). These
changes have moved the current nominal income tax closer in application to a consumption
tax. See generally DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986) (comparing
a pure income tax and an income-based consumption tax).
44. P. 314. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418,is a recent example of the type of tax legislation Johnston laments. Passed by Congress in
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overhauling the U.S. tax treatment of multinational corporations (p.
314), enacting legislation that would allow "each American a one-time
opportunity to start a business and pay no taxes on profits for the first
two or three years" (p. 314), eliminating limited liability for
partnerships composed of accountants and lawyers (p. 314), and
reforming or eliminating the alternative minimum tax (p. 315).
Some of Johnston's proposals for substantive change, such as his
proposal to exempt new businesses from taxes, would add further
complexity to an already complex tax code. 5 Other proposals, such as
reformation or repeal of the alternative minimum tax, might entail
simplification depending on how they were done. Johnston is quite
concerned with complexity in tax law; he states that "[tlhe most
overwhelming need is to simplify the tax code" (p. 312). But
simplification is not the principal driver of Johnston's reform
proposals. Instead, what apparently animates these proposals is the
theme that reappears throughout the book: the reduction of income
inequality. Johnston's proposals are attempts to achieve that goal by
assisting the lower and middle classes and reducing tax breaks that
benefit the "super rich."46
Johnston also proposes a series of procedural reforms directed at
the tax enforcement and collection process. Among other things, he
advances some general ideas about enforcement measures that the
IRS could add to its repertoire.47 Johnston also declares that Congress
should "unshackle the tax police" by ordering the IRS to pursue more
aggressively both acts of noncompliance and those tax practitioners
who facilitate noncompliance by their clients (p. 316). The extent to
which lawmakers and the IRS, on its own initiative, have begun this
process is open to debate. For the past several years, the Bush
October of 2004, the legislation provides tax benefits for manufacturing concerns, the
aviation and shipping industries, restaurant owners, and Alaskan whaling captains, among
others.
45. Johnston points out that many new businesses are not initially profitable, anyway.
P. 314.
46. Barlett and Steele offer a proposal in The Great American Tax Dodge that is
designed not only to address the issues of wealth and income inequality, but also to reduce
the substantive complexity of the federal income tax. They recommend replacing the current
income tax with a simplified, highly progressive income tax. See BARLETT & STEELE, supra
note 1, at 261-63. Their proposal is both more comprehensive and more ambitious than
Johnston's set of recommendations, and would also entail more radical change to the tax
system if adopted.
47. Johnston states:
Congress... should order them [the "tax police"] to aggressively pursue people who do not
pay any taxes or pay on only a slice of their income. Comparing income to zip codes, buying
lists of newly formed businesses and otherwise making sure no one can get away without
filing a tax return would be both fair and lucrative.
P. 316.
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Administration has proposed additional IRS funding earmarked for
increased enforcement programs,8 but regulators insist that the
increases that have actually materialized have been too small to
sustain an adequate level of enforcement. 49 The current IRS
Commissioner, who immediately succeeded Commissioner Rossotti,
said early in his tenure that he intended to reinvigorate the IRS's
enforcement programs," and new efforts have been taken by the IRS
to increase its regulation of tax practitioners. 1 In spite of these
developments, the IRS Oversight Board has reported a trend of
decreasing commitment to tax compliance by the general public. 2
In an effort "to protect taxpayers from zealous IRS agents,"
Johnston also proposes granting taxpayers whose returns were audited
but showed no additional liability a $100 reward for their trouble (pp.
316-17). It is unclear how such a program would guard against
misconduct or abuse of discretion by examining agents. The $100
reward could lead to inefficient and excessive auditing practices,
encouraging IRS agents to assert insignificant issues in order to ensure
some increase in the taxpayer's liability, no matter how small.
In order to encourage timely filing and payment, Johnston also
advocates publicizing whether a taxpayer filed the required returns
and paid the accompanying tax liabilities. Whether Johnston believes
that making such information available to the public would pressure
taxpayers into reporting honestly or encourage taxpayers to rat out
their neighbors also is not clear. Such a proposal, however, is
inconsistent with the tax code's legitimate concern for taxpayer
confidentiality and might occasion taxpayer distrust that could
48. See George Guttman, The IRS's Fiscal 2004 Budget: More or Less?, 98 TAX NOTES
486, 486 (2003); Allen Kenney, IRS Hopes for Funding Boost Dashed by House Bill, 104
TAX NOTEs 1475, 1475 (2004).
49. Mark Everson, Everson Says IRS Budget Cut Would Jeopardize Enforcement
Activities, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 189-22; Kenney, supra note 48, at 1476. The IRS
Oversight Board, created by the reform legislation in 1998, is a frequent critic of inadequate
IRS funding. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2004) at http://www.
treas.gov/irsob/documents/ 2004_annual-report.pdf ("The IRS Oversight Board has
consistently argued that the IRS needs more resources to fight back and close the tax gap.").
50. See Heidi Glenn, Everson Confirmed by Senate, 99 TAx NOTES 621 (2003) (quoting
Everson as saying that the IRS "must strengthen its enforcement of tax laws and work with
tax practitioners to ensure all taxpayers pay their fair share").
51. See Heather Bennett, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Everson Denounces Shelters,
Warns Practitioners to Follow Law, 103 TAX NOTES 795 (2004) (reporting that the recently
appointed IRS Director of Practice issued a warning to practitioners about eroding
standards of conduct).
52. IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2004) at http://www.treas.gov
irsob/documents/2004_annual-report.pdf (reporting a continuing decrease in the percentage
of Americans who feel that it is not at all acceptable to cheat on their income taxes).
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undermine voluntary compliance.5 ' By contrast, Johnston's suggestion
that the IRS should aggressively pursue tax evaders and promoters of
evasion is a good one. Visible enforcement helps promote confidence
in tax administration, which undergirds voluntary compliance. 4
Although Johnston wants to "unshackle" the IRS, he does not
specifically propose eliminating any of the 1998 "reforms."55 The set of
procedures enacted in 1998 probably increases perceptions of
procedural fairness by allowing taxpayers additional procedural rights
and opportunities to tell their side of the story,56 but, ironically, the
increase in taxpayer "rights" and the procedural requirements
applicable to the tax dispute resolution process, particularly collection
activities, along with a restructuring of the Agency, resulted in
enforcement grinding almost to a halt for a period of time." In a way,
that is not surprising, because the procedural rules Congress enacted
in the IRS Reform Act bear two hallmarks of complexity - they are
both "dense '58 and "technical."59 And hindering IRS enforcement
53. See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (declaring that tax returns and related information shall be
confidential); see also Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2003) ("[A] perception on the part of the public that the IRS does
not respect their privacy interests could generate resentment and a diminished commitment
towards compliance.").
54. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003).
55. P. 316. Although Johnston does not say so here, this prescription may entail
repealing the "ten deadly sins," which he criticized earlier in the book. See p. 150; supra text
accompanying note 18.
56. See Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax
Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 223, 227 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); see also
Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 996-
1004 (2003).
57. See pp. 151-52 (reporting statistics); see also Lederman, supra note 56, at 983-88
(same).
58. In discussing legal complexity, Professor Schuck refers to rules that "occupy a large
portion of the relevant policy space and seek to control a broad range of conduct, which
causes them to collide and conflict with their animating policies with some frequency" as
"dense" rules. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures,
42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992). Although he does not specifically refer to procedural rules, the
term should be just as applicable in the procedural context.
59. Id. at 4. Schuck has written that:
Technical rules require special sophistication or expertise on the part of those who wish to
understand and apply them. Technicality is a function of the fineness of the distinctions a
rule makes, the specialized terminology it employs, and the refined substantive judgments it
requires. The Internal Revenue Code is probably the leading example of technical rules.
Id. (footnote omitted). Again, Schuck does not expressly refer in this context to the
complexity of procedural rules, but the analysis remains applicable. For example, the
collection due process procedures enacted in 1998 entail fine distinctions, specialized
terminology, and refined judgments by both the IRS and the United States Tax Court. See
Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?
41 Hous. L. REV. 1145 (2004); Danshera Cords, How Much Process is Due?: I.R.C. Sections
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action apparently was not far from the minds of some legislators, who
stated such things as:
I think a recent Newsweek Magazine article said it best: The IRS has too
much muscle, too much money, and too little oversight. The agency is
out of control and it is not going to fix itself. Only Congress can do that.
In my view, we should overhaul - if not eventually abolish - the IRS.
Then we should scrap the Tax Code and replace it with one that is fairer
and flatter.6°
The hand-tying procedural complexity here, unlike in other
contexts, does not consist of administrative exhaustion requirements
or other rules that limit the rights of complainants.61 Instead, it is the
Agency itself that suffers the constraints of procedural complexity.62
Procedural complexity in tax administration should concern Johnston
because it facilitates noncompliance by those seeking to postpone or
avoid payment. For example, many tax protestors have taken
advantage of the collection due process procedures.63 Additional
procedures also require additional IRS time, so that the IRS cannot
process as many cases with the same number of employees.
6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51 (2004); cf Richard E.
Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 473, 505 (2003) ("As history has shown, adding procedures may ossify the
administrative process and sacrifice the ability of agencies to take effective action.").
60. 143 CONG. REC. E2306 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Riley); see also
Lederman, supra note 56, at 1010 n.188 (quoting other statements in the congressional
record). More recently, Congressman J. Dennis Hastert called for the passage of a flat tax
and the elimination of the IRS. See DENNY HASTERT, SPEAKER: LESSONS FROM FORTY
YEARS IN COACHING AND POLITICS 272 (2004).
61. Cf. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1650-51 (2003).
Professor Schlanger explains:
[T]he [Prison Litigation Reform Act] imposes no constraints on the structure or rules of any
grievance processing regime. The administrative review scheme can, for example, have as
short a deadline for inmates and as many layers of review (to each of which the inmate must
apply) as the incarcerating authority chooses. Essentially, then, the sky's the limit for the
procedural complexity or difficulty of the exhaustion regime.
Id. at 1650 (footnote omitted).
62. One type of procedural complexity agencies can be faced with is in prescribing rules
or regulations that properly implement legislative mandates. See Stephen T. Maher, Getting
Into the Act, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 285 (1994) ("Agencies that implement legislative
mandates sometimes have difficulty complying with procedural complexities while adopting
rules. The more complex the rulemaking procedure, the more likely it is that agencies will
make mistakes.").
63. Professor Camp explains:
As implemented, the [collection due process (CDP)] provisions have been a boon to tax
protestors and a pain to everyone else. As of July 31, 2003, a review of the LEXIS database
shows that since RRA 98's enactment, courts have decided 328 appeals from CDP hearings.
Of those, at least 145 involved taxpayers who could reasonably be called tax protestors.
Camp, supra note 18, at 122 (footnote omitted).
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David Bradford has distinguished among three, often
interconnected, types of tax complexity:
"compliance complexity" (referring to the problems faced by the
taxpayer in keeping records, choosing forms, making necessary
calculations, and so on); "transactional complexity" (referring to the
problems faced by taxpayers in organizing their affairs so as to minimize
their taxes within the framework of the rules); and "rule complexity"
(referring to the problems of interpreting the written and unwritten
rules). 64
Each of these are clearly related to the application of substantive tax
law to taxpayers (the regulated). They are not directly applicable to
the IRS (the apparent regulator). Procedural complexity, however,
imposes compliance complexity and rule complexity costs on the IRS
- albeit different versions of these types of complexity from those
that taxpayers face. In essence, the IRS functions as the regulated in
its interactions with Congress, its regulator.
Thus, procedures enacted to help the "little guy" stand up to the
IRS, such as those that restrict seizure of principal residences65 and
assets used in a business,' as well as the collection due process
procedures,67 while protecting some taxpayers, have imposed costs on
the IRS.' These procedures impose genuine restrictions and delays on
IRS action, both by requiring the IRS to surmount additional
procedural hurdles, such as sending additional notices,69 and because
they provide taxpayers with procedural rights that require Agency
time.7" The cost of any particular provision in isolation may be less
64. BRADFORD, supra note 43, at 266-67.
65. See I.R.C. § 6334(e)(1) (requiring approval of the U.S. district court before the IRS
may levy on a taxpayer's principal residence).
66. See id. § 6334(e)(2) (requiring approval of the IRS district director before the IRS
may levy on certain assets used by a taxpayer in his trade or business).
67. See Camp, supra note 18, at 121 ("[T]he collection due process provisions..
undermine the Service's tax liability decisionmaking.").
68. Professor Boris Bittker has advanced what Peter Schuck terms the "audience
principle," which "holds that the complexity of a rule should be tailored to the sophistication
and cost-bearing capacities of those who will have to interpret and implement it." See
Schuck, supra note 59, at 45 (citing Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 5 (1974)). This analysis applies equally well to the IRS as it does to
taxpayers. That is, the IRS apparently did not have the capacity to bear the costs of
restructuring the Agency and implementing numerous complex procedures while
maintaining the same level of enforcement of the tax laws.
69. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6330 (requiring pre-levy notice of right to collection due process
hearing); id § 6751 (requiring detailed penalty notices); id. § 7609 (requiring the IRS to
notify taxpayer of third-party summons); cf id. § 6404(g) (suspending accrual of interest on
tax deficiency and accrual of certain penalties if IRS does not notify taxpayer of asserted
deficiency within a certain period of time).
70. See, e.g., id. § 6015 (expanding the grounds upon which a spouse may be relived of
joint and several liability); id. § 6320 (requiring post-lien filing opportunity for a hearing at
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noticeable than its benefits, but the aggregate costs of procedural
complexity are too large to be assumed away, because, as Johnston
points out, the costs of IRS inaction are also borne by taxpayers.
V. CONCLUSION
Johnston is certainly not the first author to reveal instances of
corporate welfare, to allege political corruption within the IRS, or to
point out political manipulation of the Internal Revenue Code.
Academics have debated these issues on a much broader scale than
Johnston does in his book. Perfectly Legal is not an academic
monograph, nor is it intended to be. Citations are scarce and some of
those that exist cite to Johnston's own New York Times articles (see
pp. 319-27). Nonetheless, Johnston generally demonstrates a
command of substantive tax law, as well as an understanding of tax
compliance and the economics of the topics he discusses.7' The fact
that he does not address economic theories in depth generally does
not detract from his arguments and also may explain why the book
remains interesting and lively. In certain instances, however, his
efforts to draw conclusions with a broad brush lead to inconsistent
statements and unanswered questions.
The book also suffers from a lack of organization, so that the focus
sometimes switches abruptly from one chapter to the next, but this
undermines the case Johnston is trying to make more than it affects
the book's readability. Once the argument Johnston makes is
considered carefully, the pattern that emerges from the series of
narratives that comprise Perfectly Legal is not so much an
investigative report of the tax system, but rather a populist lament in
which the greed of the top executives of large corporations bears as
much responsibility as lawmakers do.
Undoubtedly, not everyone will agree with Johnston that
corporations and Congress have combined in a "covert campaign," but
Perfectly Legal is an enjoyable and informative read nonetheless.
Johnston is a good storyteller and Perfectly Legal is an interesting
book that should be accessible and informative to the general public.
Johnston also raises important issues about the tax system that
ordinarily are not the focus of books of this type. His report on the
workings of the IRS is both unusual in its perspective and very
informative. Johnston's analysis of the federal law that tied the hands
the IRS Appeals Division); id. § 6330 (requiring pre-levy opportunity for a hearing at the
IRS Appeals Division); id. § 7491 (shifting the burden of proof to the IRS in court cases if
the taxpayer establishes necessary elements); id. § 7609(a) (expanding taxpayers' right to
quash third-party summons).
71. According to Johnston's web site, he was a student of economics at several colleges,
including the University of Chicago. See http://www.perfectlylegalthebook.com/author.htm.
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of the IRS also underscores the importance of simplification - not
just of substantive tax law, but of procedural tax law as well.
